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Abstract
We show that downsizing has substantial externalities on the health of workers who remain
in the firm. To this end, we study mass layoff (ML) survivors in Austria, using workers who
survive a ML themselves, but a few years in the future, as a control group. Based on high-
quality administrative data, we find evidence that downsizing has persistent effects on mental
and physical health, and that these effects can be explained by workers fearing for their own
jobs. We also show that health externalities due to downsizing imply non-negligible cost for
firms, and that wage cuts may have similar effects.
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I. Introduction
The global economy is in crisis. With consumption and investment plunging, Europe and the
United States have witnessed a wave of massive layoffs in 2020.1 Job loss often leads to mental
and physical health problems in affected workers.2 This is particularly concerning in pandemic
times, because unemployment may exacerbate problems in the already struggling healthcare sector.
While most of the literature has focused on laid-off workers, we show that even those who remain
in downsizing firms suffer from persistent health problems. Such spillovers may arise if layoffs
trigger psychological stress in the remaining workforce, especially when survivors fear for their
own jobs or are being pushed into new tasks and responsibilities. This is particularly relevant for
firms in distress that have to decide between layoffs and wage cuts (see the discussion in Bewley
1999). If there are significant health externalities, the price of dismissing workers may be higher
than previously thought.
Job stress is believed to be the most common source of work-related illness, plaguing roughly
40 million workers across the European Union (Eurofound 2017). From the medical literature
we know that physical health often worsens after periods of stress. The literature finds strong
correlations with a variety of adverse outcomes, especially cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, and
infectious disease (Cohen et al. 2012, Dimsdale 2008, Lang et al. 2012, Steptoe & Kivimäki 2012).
Females are particularly prone to stress-induced ischemia, which are episodes of reduced blood
flow to the heart (Bacon 2018, Vaccarino et al. 2018). Ischemia is associated with increased risk of
heart attack. In addition, stress may affect physical health also indirectly through promoting poor
nutrition (e.g., Klatzkin et al. 2018), less exercise (e.g., Stults-Kolehmainen & Sinha 2014), and
risky behaviors (e.g., Porcelli & Delgado 2009).
To test for the health externalities of downsizing, we study workers who remain in firms that
1In the US, Disney has recently laid off 28,000 workers, Ralph Lauren 3,600; Allstate 3,800; and American Airlines
and United Airlines a combined 31,000. Source: Time (2020), https://time.com/5895669/pandemic-layoffs/
(last accessed December 5, 2020).
2See, e.g., Browning&Heinesen (2012), Cygan-Rehm, Kuehnle&Oberfichtner (2017), Kuhn, Lalive&Zweimüller
(2009), Schaller & Stevens (2015), Schiele & Schmitz (2016), Sullivan & von Wachter (2009).
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underwent a mass layoff (ML) between 1998 and 2014 in Upper Austria. We have access to high-
quality administrative records from the main public health insurance provider, covering the universe
of inpatient and outpatient claims of all Upper Austrian workers. To avoid selection problems, we
construct counterfactuals by using workers who survive a ML a few years in the future as a control
group, observing them before they experience a ML themselves.3 This gives rise to a difference-
in-differences (DD) framework. On average, workers in the control group should be similar in
unobserved characteristics to those in the treatment group and only differ in the timing of the MLs
they are exposed to.
We find that surviving a ML leads to persistent health issues. Our DD estimates suggest that
drug prescriptions and hospital admissions increase substantially after MLs. Within one and a half
years, prescriptions increase by 2.4 percent and hospital days by 12.4 percent in the remaining
workforce. Downsizing triggers a variety of health problems. Our estimates indicate upticks in
mental, cardiovascular, and to a lesser degree alsomusculoskeletal disease. Workerswith preexisting
conditions are more strongly affected, and female workers face particularly fierce consequences.
Their probability of having a cardiac event temporarily increases by up to 0.05 percentage points,
or 58 percent, due to the ML. This is consistent with the recent medical literature suggesting that
women are more likely to experience stress-related cardiac events than men (Vaccarino et al. 2018).
Several robustness checks confirm these results. Most importantly, we can show that using an
alternative control group composed of workers who are not affected by MLs themselves does not
affect our conclusions.
We find that workers from poor socioeconomic background are particularly susceptible to
adverse health consequences, and that effects are strongest in large firms where turnover had been
low prior to the ML. Moreover, we show that job insecurity, and not changes in income or workload,
is an important mechanism that may explain our findings. This is supported by the fact that our
estimates are stronger in areas with high unemployment and for workers with low-income spouses,
where the potential cost of unemployment are likely to be higher. Finally, we find that changes in
3This is in the spirit of Fadlon & Nielsen (2019), who compare health behaviors in families that experience similar
health shocks but a few years apart.
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worker health impose non-negligible costs for firms, as sick days in the retained workforce increase
by up to 18 percent per quarter. For a firm of 500, this translates to additional direct labor cost
of about e 150,000 per year. We then compare this to changes in sick leave takeup in a separate
sample of workers in firms that cut wages of at least one coworker by more than 10 percent. We
find some evidence that downsizing and wage cuts lead to similar health spillovers.
This paper builds on the existing literature studying the health status of victims of mass layoffs
and plant closures, showing that job loss has negative effects on workers (e.g., Browning&Heinesen
2012, Cygan-Rehm, Kuehnle & Oberfichtner 2017, Kuhn, Lalive & Zweimüller 2009, Schaller &
Stevens 2015, Schiele & Schmitz 2016, Sullivan & von Wachter 2009), their spouses (Marcus
2013), and their children (Schaller & Zerpa 2017). However, these papers focus on workers that
actually lost their jobs, while we study effects on those who remain employed with the downsizing
firm. This offers a new angle on the overall welfare effects of downsizing and allows us to estimate
firm-level health externalities for the first time.4
While other studies have considered survivor health, these papers are mostly descriptive in
nature, using survey data to study correlations with sick days and mental conditions. Østhus (2012)
use survey data and panel data models to estimate changes in self-reported psychological distress
among workers in downsizing firms, Le Clainche & Lengagne (2019) compare antidepressant
use between French workers who report working in firms that underwent a ML in the last year
with other workers not reporting firm MLs, and Østhus & Mastekaasa (2010), Sigursteinsdóttir
& Rafnsdóttirr (2015), and Vahtera et al. (2004) study correlations of firm turnover rates with
sick days. Although these papers provide valuable insights, there are reasonable concerns that
impede a causal interpretation of their findings. In particular, they cannot properly account for the
selection into surviving a downsizing period. Moreover, while the existing literature has focused
on few select outcomes, our rich administrative data allow us to study different health responses in
a comprehensive manner. We are also the first to provide evidence on mechanisms governing these
effects, and to study implications for firm decision making more broadly.
4A related paper is also Gathmann et al. (2020), who show that MLs can have local multiplier effects that cause
entire regions to suffer employment losses.
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Our paper also speaks to the literature on the health effects of job stress. It consists mostly of
epidemiological studies, which tend to find strong correlations between job stress and health (for
meta-analyses, see, e.g., Jamison et al. 2004, Nixon et al. 2011). However, these papers are typically
cross-sectional and based on surveys with few observations and self-reported health measures.
Especially the former raises questions about endogeneity, and in particular reverse causality, in
the sense that ill health may cause stress as well. Design-based studies are comparably scarce.
Often they focus on different types of stress, in particular shocks during childhood, such as famines
(Lindeboom, Portrait & van den Berg 2010, van den Berg, Pinger & Schoch 2016) or the death
of a family member (Persson & Rossin-Slater 2018, Schmidpeter 2019). Another strand of the
literature interprets bad economic conditions as stress and estimates effects on health, both during
childhood (van den Berg, Lindeboom & Portrait 2006) and adulthood (e.g., Pierce & Schott 2020,
Ruhm 2000, 2016). We also speak to literature showing that unemployment leads to increases in
‘deaths of despair’ (i.e., deaths due to drug and alcohol abuse and suicides) using aggregate data
for the US (e.g., Case & Deaton 2017, Hollingsworth et al. 2017). Our results suggest that these
aggregate effects may partly arise because even workers who are only indirectly affected by job loss
suffer from serious health problems too.
Our paper is also related to the personnel and management literature that studies whether a firm
in distress should cut wages across the board or downsize its workforce (Lazear & Gibbs 2014).
Early theoretical work by Weiss (1980) argues that general wage cuts will lead to adverse selection,
because the most productive workers leave the firm. In line with this, a variety of studies show
that wage cuts hurt worker morale, lead to productivity losses, increase absenteeism, and lead to
premature job terminations (Cohn et al. 2014, Coviello et al. 2018, Kube et al. 2013). We extend
this literature by showing that there are considerable side effects from downsizing too, and that they
are comparable to health spillovers associated with wage cuts.
Our findings have several implications for management and policy. We document that MLs
emit substantial externalities on the remaining workforce, and this additional burden cannot be
internalized by firms alone. Thus, there is scope for government to provide more help for stress-
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plagued workers. In particular, health counseling or targeted prevention measures after downsizing
periods may be helpful to circumvent unintended externalities for the retained workforce. It
is important to note that the adverse health effects we document appear in spite of Austria’s
universal healthcare system. In countries with less generous safety net programs, such effects
may be even more pronounced. Also, since our results suggest that job insecurity is the main
reason workers experience increased stress during downsizing periods, management may consider
providing reassurance or, in extreme cases, even short-term job guarantees to help cushion these
effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we discuss the institutional setting. In section III
we present our data and empirical methodology in more depth. In section IV we discuss our main
results on health and stress-related outcomes and provide several robustness checks. In section V
we test for different mechanisms. In section VI we discuss the consequences of our findings for
firms and management. Finally, in section VII we conclude.
II. Setting
II.1. Social security
Austria has a Bismarckian social security system with universal access to healthcare, pension,
disability, and unemployment benefits. Enrollment into the system is automatic and linked to em-
ployment, but insurance is also extended to spouses and children, unemployed people, pensioners,
and individuals with disabilities. In fact, 99.9% of the population is covered by health insurance
(Hofmarcher-Holzhacker & Quentin 2013). It covers a wide range of services, including visits to
outpatient GPs and specialists, inpatient care, and prescription drugs with no or only minor copay-
ments. Although there is no mandatory gatekeeping system, general practitioners are traditionally
the first point of access to the healthcare system. In this paper we focus on Upper Austria, which




Austria’s labor market is characterized by strong industrial relations and a system of centralized
bargaining for wages and working conditions. Per capita GDP is among the highest worldwide;
unemployment is low but has been increasing steadily in recent years. Female labor market
participation has traditionally been low, and almost 50 percent of females that participate in the
labor market work part-time (StatAUT 2020), which is significantly higher than the OECD average.
The labor market is flexible, with relatively weak protection against dismissal and high turnover
rates compared to other European countries (Böheim 2017). The law distinguishes whether labor
contracts are terminated unilaterally or in mutual agreement. Unilateral terminations generally do
not require a reason to be specified, but a statutory notice period has to be observed.6
The Austrian unemployment office mandates a system of advance layoff reporting. Firms have
to consult the unemployment office at least 30 days in advance prior to laying off a large share of
their workforce. The law defines a ML as a layoff of 5 or more employees in firms with 10 to 99
employees, at least 5 percent of employees in firms with 100 to 599 employees, and at least 30 in
firms with 600 or more employees. Notification is also required for layoffs of at least 5 employees
who are older than 50 years of age. We use these thresholds to identify mass layoff events. In firms
with a works council, management has to consult the works council prior to the notification as well.
In Austria, workers are automatically enrolled into the public unemployment insurance (UI)
system, which is financed through a 6 percent payroll tax. UI benefit length depends on work
experience and age, and varies between 20 weeks and one year.7 A necessary condition to receive
5We focus on Upper Austria because this is the only Austrian federal state we have health insurance data for.
The Austrian population is generally quite homogeneous. For example, the difference in average dispensable income
between the top and bottom 20 percent of the regional income distribution is only e 1,909 (OECD 2015). Hence, we
have no reason to believe that Upper Austria is not representative for the entire country.
6An exception are fixed-term contracts, which can only end by expiration, unless the employee agrees to terminate
the contract. Pregnant women before and after childbirth and workers on parental leave are generally protected from
dismissal.
7Longer UI duration in Austria has been shown affect reemployment wages (Nekoei & Weber 2017) and health for
those laid-off (Ahammer & Packham 2020).
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UI benefits is that claimants are willing to accept reasonable employment or undergo retraining. The
replacement rate is 55 percent of pre-unemployment earnings. After benefit exhaustion, workers are
eligible for means-tested income support. Due to the short benefit period, the Austrian UI system
is more comparable to the US and the United Kingdom than other European countries (Halla et al.
2020).
III. Empirical Strategy
Estimating the effect of surviving aML on health presents us with an important empirical challenge.
Workers do not survive MLs exogenously, hence simple pre-post analyses would most likely lead
to biased estimates. Furthermore, we cannot compare survivors with non-survivors or the general
population, as survivors are positively selected. We therefore use workers who survive a ML
sufficiently far in the future as a control group. These workers should, on average, have similar
characteristics to the treated workers, and only differ in the timing they experience their ML. This
is similar in spirit to Fadlon & Nielsen (2019), who compare health behaviors in families that
experience the same health shocks a few years apart.
Figure A.1 sketches how we select the treatment and the control group. For a ML in quarter C,
we observe worker health between C − 6 and C + 6. The control group is comprised of all MLs
occurring between C + 7 and C + 13, but we observe survivor health in these firms also between C − 6
and C + 6, with the ‘placebo’ ML occurring in C = 0. This means that workers in the control group
have to be continuously employed for at least 20 quarters with the same firm to qualify as survivors
(C − 6 until at least C + 13). We impose the same tenure requirement to the treatment group to obtain
a consistent sample definition.
Note that, in principal, it is possible that the pre-treatment period for control MLs coincides
with the post-treatment period of the treatment MLs, although never for the same ML. This is
similar to the treatment and control group definition in Fadlon & Nielsen (2019). We adopt this
strategy to maximize the set of possible control MLs to draw from. It means, however, that we
would overestimate the effect of MLs if health in the control group systematically became worse
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prior to their ML. However, this is not what we see in the raw data (see Figure A.2). In fact, health
status seems to be remarkably stable prior to MLs, both in the treatment and the control group.
Nevertheless, we show a robustness check below which indicates that our results replicate if we
draw the control group from a different set of workers who never experience a ML.
Based on this sample definition, we estimate the effect of surviving a ML on health using a
difference-in-differences (DD) model,
H8C = \8 + \C + W-8C + V(8C + Y8C , (1)
where H8C is health of worker 8 in quarter C, \8 are worker×MLfixed effects that control for systematic
time-invariant heterogeneity between workers and MLs, \C are calendar quarter fixed effects that
account for shocks common to all workers in a specific quarter, -8C contains flexible sets of worker
age and tenure dummies, (8C is an indicator variable equal to one for all workers who survive a ML
in C, and zero for the group of future survivors who experience a ML between C + 7 and C + 13. Our
coefficient of interest is V̂, which is the average treatment effect of downsizing on survivor health.
Because health status may be correlated among workers in the same firm, we cluster our standard
errors on the firm level.
To explore dynamic treatment effects, we additionally estimate a generalized DD model where
we extend equation (1) to allow for the effect of downsizing on survivor health to vary non-
parametrically in a period spanning 6 quarters before and after the ML,
H8C = \8 + \C + W-8C +
6∑
:=−6 | :≠0
V: (g: × (8C) + Y8C , (2)
where g: = 1{C = :}, : = −6, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 6 indicates quarters relative to the ML in C = 0, and
the post-ML coefficients (V1, . . . , V6) is the series of period-specific treatment effects on health.
The crucial assumption for identification is that the difference in health between the treatment and
control group would continue along the same trend absent the ML. We present evidence in support
of this assumption in a number of ways. First, we show that the estimated leading coefficients
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( V̂−6, . . . , V̂−1) are insignificantly different from zero across all our outcomes. Second, we use
workers drawn from the general population as an alternative control group. Third, we show that
our results are stable when we reweight the sample so that the treatment and control group have the
same covariate distribution, and, alternatively, when we give more weight to larger MLs. Fourth, we
perform a placebo test using cancer as an outcome that cannot be affected by MLs in the short-run.
III.1. Data
We use high-quality administrative data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD,
Zweimüller et al. 2009) linked with health records from the Upper Austrian Sickness Fund (UASF).
The ASSD is structured as a linked employer-employee panel and covers the universe of Austrian
workers from the 1970s onward. It contains detailed administrative records originally used to verify
pension claims. We use the ASSD to obtain information on MLs and employment histories, wages,
and certain demographics for affected workers. The limitations of the ASSD data are top-coded
wages and the lack of information on working hours.
The UASF database comprises individual-level information on healthcare service utilization
in both the inpatient and outpatient sector for members of the sickness fund. We have data
on drug prescriptions, sick leaves, hospital stays, and physician visits. Diagnoses are recorded
as International Classification of Diseases, 2010 revision (ICD-10) codes, and drugs using the
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system. The UASF covers around one
million members representing roughly 75% of the population in Upper Austria. Except for workers
in the railway and mining industries, all private-sector employees in Upper Austria are insured with
the UASF. Farmers, self-employed persons, and civil servants are covered by other institutions.
For our empirical analysis we consider the universe of all MLs between 1998 and 2014 in Upper
Austria. To identifyMLs we use the so-calledworker flow approach as outlined in Fink et al. (2010).
In short, we use the ASSD to build a quarterly panel measuring the number of employees in each
plant. Drops in firm sizes between two quarters are considered as MLs whenever they exceed the
thresholds inspired by the system of advance layoff reporting described in section II.2. Events in
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which a larger group of employees moves to the same plant identifier are excluded (this indicates a
change in plant identifiers or a corporate spinoff instead of a true ML). Similar to other papers in
the literature (e.g., Ichino et al. 2017) we drop seasonal industries, such as farming, construction,
mining, and hospitality from the sample. In total, we have 2,203,214 observations in our sample,
which is composed of 42,703 worker-ML dyads observed over 13 quarters in the treatment group,
and 126,775 worker-ML dyads observed over 13 quarters in the control group, which we drew with
replacement.
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) are means and standard
deviations for the full sample. In columns (3) and (4) we show means for all variables for the
treatment and control group, respectively. It is reassuring that the means between the two groups
are fairly similar for most variables, which suggests that our sample is well-balanced.8 Workers who
survive a ML are on average 40.7 years old, have 10 years of tenure, are more likely to be male and
blue collar workers, work in firms with around 300 employees, and experience MLs where roughly
8 percent of the workforce is laid off. The turnover rate one year prior to the ML, measured by
the number of worker exits relative to the firm size, is around 4 percent, on average, and the local
unemployment rate in the firms’ zip code area is 11 percent.
It is worthwhile to point out two statistics here. First, average tenure in our sample is 10 years,
which is rather long. The reason is that we require both the treatment and the control group to be
employed 13 quarters prior to the ML. This has implications for external validity, as our design
speaks mainly to workers in stable employment. Second, the relative ML size appears low at first
sight. However, compared to the average firm size, an 8 percent reduction corresponds to 25 workers
being laid off, the standard deviation amounts to another 15 workers. While we are confident that
seeing 25 colleagues fired at once can indeed trigger stress in most people, we note that effects may
be even bigger if we focused on larger MLs. Moreover, we show below that our estimates are not
affected if we weight the data by ML size prior to running our DD regressions.
8In section 5, we additionally show that reweighting the data so that the treatment and control group have the
same covariate distribution does not affect our estimates. To generate these unit weights we use the entropy balancing
approach suggested by Hainmueller (2012).
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III.2. Health measures
We use several proxies for worker health. Our primary measures are physician visits, drug prescrip-
tions, and inpatient stays. Physician visits comprise all consultations with general practitioners and
specialists which are paid at least in part by the UASF.9 We measure both the number of visits as
well as the log sum of expenditure billed to the UASF for these visits (these are essentially doctors’
fees). For both we include also observations with no expenditures. This gives an average 5.2
physician visits with e 56 in fees (see Table 1). For the latter we take the log to give less weight
to extreme outliers,10 and we add e 1 prior to taking the log in order not to lose observations with
zero expenditures.
Prescription data include the names and ATC codes of every medication that requires a pre-
scription in Austria. We have no information on over-the-counter drugs. As outcomes we use
the total number of drug packages prescribed and the sum of log expenditure for these drugs. On
average, workers have 1.17 prescriptions per quarter worth e 25. Hospital data are only available
for inpatient stays, we do not observe ambulance visits. Again, we consider both the number of
days spent in hospital (on average 0.2 days) as well as the sum of log expenditures for these hospital
stays (with a mean before taking logs of e 29). Here the means are rather low, again because we
include also observations with zero hospital days and expenditures.
In a second step we consider three specific medical conditions that are proposed as potential
consequences of job stress in the literature: mental or psychological conditions, cardiovascular
disease, and musculoskeletal disease. For mental conditions we consider anxiety (ICD-10 codes
F40 and F41), depression and persistent mood disorders (F32, F33, F34, F38, and F39), and
burnout (F43 and Z73). We construct binary variables indicating whether any of these conditions
9This may exclude visits to private physicians if patients do not claim those expenses from the insurance. Every
treatment provided by a private physician is eligible for a refund by the UASF up to the amount the health insurance
would have reimbursed a contracted physician for the same treatment. We are therefore confident that a vast majority
of such visits will be in fact claimed.
10Extreme outliers are usually observed in health data, because severe illness can trigger exorbitant healthcare
spending. Also in our sample maximum outpatient expenditures are more than 112 times larger than the mean.
However, only few observations have such large values. The 99th percentile of the expenditure distribution is e 439,
which is only about 4 standard deviations larger than the sample mean of e 56 (see Table 1).
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is diagnosed in a quarter. Additionally, we observe psychotherapies, which are covered by public
health insurance in Austria. We also consider log expenditures for antidepressants (N06A), which
are the most important drugs used to treat mental conditions.
Cardiovascular disease we define as having either a stroke or a heart attack, but we also
consider expenditures for cardiovascular system drugs (ATC category C), which primarily include
antihypertensives, diuretics, beta blockers, and anti-cholesterol drugs. Moreover, any condition in
ICD-10 chapter M is considered a musculoskeletal disease. For related drugs, we aggregate log
expenses for both opioid (ATC codes N01AH and N02A) and non-opioid painkillers (M01, M02,
and N02B). Finally, we consider drugs approved for addiction treatment in ATC categories N07BB
(alcohol) and N07BC (opioids) to test for effects on risky health behaviors. Sample means for these
outcomes can also be found in Table 1.
IV. Results
IV.1. Effects on worker health
The main results are in Table 2. We present both the average DD effects from the model in
equation (1) in panel (a) and the dynamic DD effects from equation (2) in panel (b). We test
the pre-ML coefficients for joint significance instead of reporting them individually, but full event
studies can be found in Figure 1. Indeed, we find no evidence for significant pretrends in any of our
health outcomes.
A consistent finding is that downsizing leads to increases in healthcare utilization for the
remaining workforce, and that this effect becomes stronger over time. First, however, we find that
workers see physicians after the ML at the same rate as before the ML. The estimate for physician
visits is small and insignificant. This is an important finding, because it suggests that any negative
health effects do not arise owing to failures to seek medical help. We do find, however, a sizable
impact on drug prescriptions and inpatient days. The average number of drug prescriptions increases
by 0.03 or 2.4 percent of the sample mean (column 3), and inpatient days increase by 0.014 or 12.4
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percent of the sample mean (column 5). These effects increase up to the sixth quarter after the ML,
where the increase in drug prescriptions amounts to 6.8 percent and the increase in hospital days
amounts to 47 percent. Hence, even though we find that outpatient physician visits remain constant,
we find that more drugs are prescribed per visit and hospital days increase too.
We also consider log expenditures for both drugs and inpatient stays to get a sense of how
effects compare at the intensive and extensive margin of healthcare utilization. We find that drug
expenditures increase, on average, by 1.2 percent, and inpatient expenditures increase by 1.4 percent.
Again, these estimates are largest in the 6th quarter after the ML. At this stage the estimated effects
are remarkably similar; we find that expenditures for physician visits, drugs, and hospital days
increase by around 4–5 percent. For hospital expenditures, this would amount to an increase from
e 28.9 to e 30.3, which is relatively small. This suggests that effects are stronger at the extensive
than at the intensive margin.
A recurring pattern is that coefficient magnitudes increase over time, and effects are strongest
towards the end of the observation period. This is perhaps unsurprising, as a negative health shock
likely takes time to burgeon its full impact on the body. Also, workers may develop comorbidities
after an initial health shock, for example if cardiac conditions lead to other physical or mental
problems. Together with the fact that health status is state-dependent at least to some degree
(Contoyannis et al. 2004, Finkelstein et al. 2009, Halliday 2008), we expect healthcare spending to
remain high or even increase after a large enough health shock. Recent medical studies show that
even minor stress events can lead to rather severe health problems that linger for 10 years or more
(Korkeila et al. 2010, Leger et al. 2018).
IV.2. Effects on stress
Next, we ask whether these effects can be explained by increases in psychological stress levels.
While we cannot measure stress directly, we consider a set of outcomes that have been suggested as
potential consequences of job stress in the literature. In particular, we estimate effects on mental,
cardiovascular, and musculoskeletal health (Dimsdale 2008, Lang et al. 2012, Steptoe & Kivimäki
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2012). These estimates are summarized in Table 3. In short, we find some evidence for all three
mechanisms, but the major drivers seem to be upticks in mental and cardiovascular disease.
We first consider mental conditions. While we do not see effects on new mental diagnoses,
workers are more likely to be in psychotherapy and have higher expenses on antidepressants. In
particular, MLs increase the probability of psychotherapy on average by about 20 percent, and this
effect sets in soon after the layoff. The effect on antidepressants is more modest; two quarters
after the layoff, we estimate that expenditures increase by 0.5 percent.11 Since new diagnoses
remain unaffected at first, we interpret our results as evidence that workers with preexisting mental
conditions are more strongly affected by MLs.
We do not find effects on cardiac conditions in the form of heart attacks and strokes. We note,
however, that these are rare events, hencewemay not have enough power to detect meaningful effects
here. In contrast, expenses for cardiovascular system drugs, such as beta blockers or cholesterol
drugs, increase by up to 0.7 percent. This effect accumulates over time; in the 6th quarter it amounts
to as much as 2 percent. Musculoskeletal conditions and pain killer prescriptions increase too, but
these effects kick in relatively late as well. The increase in both new diagnoses and expenditures
for pain killers amounts to roughly 10 percent.
Finally, we test for effects on risky behaviors. This is important, as job stress may drive workers
into alcohol or drug abuse. These behaviors are difficult to measure in administrative data, but we
can leverage information on medication-assisted alcohol and opioid addiction treatments. Since
these treatments are usually considered to be an ultima ratio, we can only identify severe cases of
addiction. Estimates are provided in Table 4. We find no effects of MLs on alcohol treatment,
and the point estimates on opioid treatment are imprecisely estimated despite being relatively large
compared to the sample mean. However, severe addiction may take too long to develop for us
to find meaningful effects in a 1.5-year window after the ML. Furthermore, the sample means in
Table 4 suggest that addiction treatment is a very rare outcome, hence our design may simply be too
11We note that, for antidepressant expenditure, the joint -test for pretrends is 2.2, which is significant at the 5
percent level. In Figure A.3 (web appendix), we plot each pre- and post-ML coefficient graphically. We can show that
the -test fails because of a single significant coefficient for C = −2. The flat trend prior to the ML makes us confident,
however, that there is no systematic pattern we have to worry about.
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underpowered to detect any effects. We therefore find that job loss affects the health of workers who
remain in the company primarily through mental and cardiac conditions, and that this contributes
to an increase in inpatient days and drug prescriptions. There is some evidence that stress affects
workers with preexisting conditions more strongly, but we also find an impact on new diagnoses.
IV.3. Robustness
An important empirical challenge for our paper is the choice of an appropriate control group. We
think that future survivors are the optimal fit, because we can reasonably assume that they share
similar unobserved characteristics with current survivors. We can show, however, that other control
group choices lead to similar conclusions. In particular, we present results using a control group that
is drawn from the general population of workers in Upper Austria. To make this a fair comparison,
however, we first estimate a propensity score that measures the probability of surviving a ML
conditional on certain predetermined variables for every worker in the population, and then select
only those workers who have the largest propensities but are not already in our main sample. To
this end, we first estimate a logit model that regresses the probability a worker survives a ML on
age, tenure, and year fixed effects, all fully interacted with gender. We then predict conditional ML
survival probabilities for each worker based on this logit model, and select only the 75,000 workers
with the highest predicted probabilities (which yields a reasonable sample size). This ensures that
the new control group has similar balancing properties with regard to age, tenure, and sex as our
main control group.
We present estimates for this alternative control group in Table 5, panel (a). For comparison, we
report the baseline results from Table 2 in panel (b). We can see that the control group choice does
not affect our estimates. Coefficients are slightly smaller, but generally well within the range of our
baseline specification. This is perhaps to be expected, given that our propensity score balancing
procedure ensures that the two control groups we compare here share a similar age and tenure
composition. However, it is reassuring that using a completely different set of workers, notably ones
that are not struck by a ML themselves in the future, does not affect our conclusions whatsoever.
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Despite our preferred treatment and control group being very similar in terms of observables
(see Table 1), in a next step we show that, even if the groups were perfectly balanced, our results
would remain unchanged. We use the entropy balancing approach proposed by Hainmueller (2012),
which generates unit weights that ensure that the reweighted treatment and control group have the
same covariate distribution.12 We present our DD estimates based on these reweighted samples in
Figure A.4. For reference, we also plot the baseline estimates from Table 2 and their 95 percent
confidence intervals. The reweighted estimates, indicated by the green line, are close to the baseline
across outcomes, we therefore conclude that differences in observables are unlikely to explain our
treatment effects.
Moreover, we test whether there are effects on health outcomes that cannot possibly be affected
by job stress due to surviving a ML. An obvious candidate for such a placebo test is cancer. Even
though stress may increase the risk of certain cancers in the longer run, there should not be any
effects within six quarters after the ML, in particular if workers are not more likely to seek medical
help in the first place due to the ML (as we have shown above). We therefore match information on
malignant neoplasms (ICD category C) to our data, using a binary indicator for whether a neoplasm
is diagnosed as the outcome variable in our DD model. We report the results of this test in Figure 4.
The estimated coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant in all periods.
Another potential concern is that we pool MLs regardless of size in our regressions, and these
MLs can be relatively small (the Austrian UI office stipulates that a 5 percent reduction in the
workforce constitutes a ML). If small MLs drove our results, we would potentially estimate only a
lower bound of the true effect of downsizing on survivor health. In Figure A.5, we therefore present
our DD estimations where observations are weighted by the relative ML size (i.e., the number of
laid-off workers relative to the pre-ML firm size). The green lines represent the point estimates
from these weighted regressions, and these lie well within the confidence interval of our baseline
estimates (the black line). This suggests that our results are practically unchanged if we attach more
12We calibrate the entropy weights such that the age, tenure, gender, and occupation distribution is the same in the
treatment and control group. An advantage of this approach is that it not only balances the means across groups but
also the second and third moments.
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weight to workers exposed to larger MLs.
Lastly, an important question is whether we in fact capture job stress by looking at ML survivors.
If, for example, workers retaliated against their employers by obtaining bogus sick leave certificates,
the interpretation of our findings would be different. In such a case, we would expect health effects
only to be present in the outpatient sector, and for typical shirking diagnoses such as low back pain.
This is not what we find. In fact, our results are mostly driven by hospital stays, which are almost
impossible to fake. Moreover, shirking cannot explain the fact that cardiac conditions go up by
more than 50 percent for women in response to the ML.
V. Effect heterogeneity and mechanisms
V.1. Which workers are most affected?
For management and policy to effectively counteract the negative health effects of downsizing, it is
vital to understand the mechanisms governing these effects. In a first step, we therefore split our
sample by several baseline socioeconomic characteristics to determine which workers suffer most
from downsizing. This will help us to think about potential channels in the sections below. We
present these results in Table 6. We report average treatment effects from equation (1) for each
subsample, where age is split at 40 years and tenure and wages are split at their sample medians. We
consider only count outcomes (columns 1, 3, and 5 from Table 2), but results for log expenditures
are similar.
A consistent finding is that our results are entirely driven by older, blue collar, and especially
low-wage workers. This is perhaps unsurprising, as these groups are generally more susceptible
to adverse health shocks. While old age is related to ill-health, poor socioeconomic background is
also correlated with risky behavior and morbidity (Case & Deaton 2017). For gender, the pattern
is less clear. While drug prescriptions react stronger for males, effects on inpatient days are more
pronounced for females. Hospitalizations are typically necessary to treat more severe conditions, a
naïve interpretation of these estimates would therefore be that females face fiercer consequences of
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stress than men. To validate this, we investigate cardiac events by gender.13
These estimates are in Figure 2. They suggest that females indeed face a higher risk of cardiac
events (panel a), and higher expenditure for cardiovascular drugs (panel b) due to the ML. Although
the estimated coefficients appear small at face value (4 quarters after the ML, the effect on cardiac
events is 0.05 percentage points), compared to the sample mean this corresponds to an increase
of 58 percent. This partly explains why females have more hospital days after the ML, and is
consistent with the recent medical literature suggesting that women are more susceptible to heart
problems following stressful events than men (Bacon 2018). In fact, women’s risk to develop
stress–induced myocardial ischemia is twice as high than men’s, and this difference cannot be
explained by psychosocial or clinical risk factors (Vaccarino et al. 2018).14 We conclude that
vulnerable workers deserve special attention during downsizing periods, while younger, high-wage,
white collar workers are hardly affected.
V.2. The role of wages
Above we have shown that low-wage workers are particularly susceptible to adverse health effects
after downsizing periods. While the literature is divided as to whether income in itself can cause
health to decline,15 it may be correlated with other variables that make it more difficult for the
worker to cope with negative health shocks, such as poor education, nutrition, or housing. A natural
exercise is therefore to check whether wage levels have changed for survivors before and after the
downsizing period. It is possible that managers see wage cuts as a complement to downsizing,
rather than a substitute. If this were the case, we would perhaps not measure stress but a mechanical
income effect, in the sense that workers have less money to invest in their health stock after the ML.
In Figure 3, we plot wage trends relative to the ML over all survivors. The graph depicts average
13We also estimated the effects of stress on mental and musculoskeletal health by gender, but found no significant
heterogeneity in these outcomes.
14Stress-induced ischemia is found to result mostly from constriction of tiny arteries. This results in greater resistance
which requires the heart to use more force in pumping blood.
15Lindahl (2005), for example, documents positive effects of lottery earnings on health, while Ahammer et al. (2017)
show that there is no causal relationship between labor income and mortality. Snyder & Evans (2006) even find that
higher social security payments lead to higher mortality.
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daily wages that are regression-adjusted for age, gender, tenure, occupation, and quarter-year fixed
effects. We see pretty much a flat profile before and after a ML. This confirms that income effects
cannot explain our findings. Also, if we assume that workers would bargain for higher wages if
their workload increased substantially after a ML, it is unlikely that our effects can be explained by
systematic changes in job requirements given the wage pattern we observe. We will explore this
mechanism further below.
V.3. The role of the firm
Next we test whether our results mask important heterogeneity by firm characteristics. In Table 7,
we split the sample by firm size (more or less than 200 workers, which is one of the UI office ML
thresholds), relative ML size (number of laid-off workers relative to the pre-ML firm size, split at
the median), and the pre-ML turnover rate (number of exiting workers one year prior to the ML over
the firm size one year prior to the ML, also split at the median). We again report average treatment
effects from equation (1) for each subsample.
We find that effects tend to be stronger in larger firms with low turnover rates. This suggests
that workers with little previous exposure to coworker fluctuation are driving our results, which is
consistent with the idea that stress is most intense when workers did not expect a large layoff and
perhaps considered their job to be secure prior to the layoff. For ML size, the pattern is ambiguous.
While severe conditions that require hospitalization increase by the same margin regardless of ML
size, mild conditions proxied by drug prescriptions go up more for smaller MLs. This suggests that,
for the latter, exposure to a ML itself is more important than the actual number of colleagues laid
off. This also explains why our estimates are practically unchanged if we weight each observation
by the fraction of workers laid off (Figure A.5). Moreover, since it is less likely that workload is
redistributed among remaining workers to a significant extent if the company is large and only few
colleagues are laid off, changes in job requirements are unlikely to drive our results.
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V.4. The role of job insecurity
The management literature identifies the fear of losing one’s own job as the main source of stress
in workers during downsizing periods (e.g., Klehe et al. 2011). Isolating this mechanism can be
difficult absent survey data, but we believe that singling out workers with characteristics that are
correlated with higher potential cost of unemployment helps us to assess the relative importance of
job insecurity versus other mechanisms (e.g., an increased workload) in explaining our results.16
Many of the characteristics that make workers more vulnerable to adverse health shocks also
raise the cost of unemployment. In particular, the ‘scarring’ effect of unemployment—i.e., persistent
long-term losses in wage and employment opportunities following unemployment—is particularly
pronounced for low-wage workers (Jarosch 2015, Pinheiro & Visschers 2015) and to some degree
also older workers (Ichino et al. 2017). Moreover, low-wage blue collar jobs may be perceived as
bad signals on the job market, making job search more difficult (McCormick 1990). In section IV.1
we have seen that these groups are driving our results, which is consistent with fear of job loss being
an important mechanism.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 7, we additionally compare health responses in regions with
low and high unemployment. When outside options are scarce, and when the chances of finding
employment again are perceived as being small because of high competition among job seekers,
we would naturally expect fear of job loss to be more prevalent in the working population. If we
split the zip code-level unemployment rate at the sample median, we find that our results are indeed
driven exclusively by MLs in areas with high unemployment. We consider this as strong evidence
that fear of job loss is the main mechanism behind our findings.
In a similar vein, we can check how our estimates differ by spousal wage. The idea is that workers
with high-earning spouses are less likely to experience job insecurity, because the relative potential
drop in household income following job loss would be smaller. We therefore draw a subsample of
workers we know are married in a given year and reestimate our DD model from equation (1).17 We
16We note that these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and may, in fact, correlate with each other. This makes
it more difficult to give a definitive answer as to what mechanism dominates.
17We do not have a perfect measure of marital status, but we can infer marriages from different tax deductions and
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present these estimates for both sexes separately in Table A.1. Indeed, we find that point estimates
are larger for workers with low-wage spouses. This is especially the case for drug prescriptions in
females and hospital days in males. This supports the notion that job insecurity is the main driver
behind our health effects.
VI. The cost for firms
For firms, perhaps the most relevant parameter when it comes to internalizing possible health
externalities is productivity. Since productivity is difficult for us to observe, the second-best
measure we have to analyze the impact on firms is sick leaves. Sick leaves are costly (Ziebarth &
Karlsson 2010), even in economies without universal sick pay mandates, such as the United States.
In Figure 5, we therefore regress our dynamic DD model on worker sick days. The pattern we
find is similar to the outcomes we have studied before. There is an immediate uptick in sick days
immediately after the ML, and the effect increases in magnitude over time. If we estimate a single
post-ML coefficient, we obtain an average effect of 0.14 sick days per quarter. Compared to the
sample mean of 2.25 days per quarter, this corresponds to a 6.5 percent increase. This is well within
the range of our other estimates. After six quarters, sick days already increase by 18 percent, which
is substantial.
To get a sense of how important this effect is, it is useful to translate the increase in sick days into
monetary cost. The average daily wage in our sample is e 94; the total labor cost, including social
security contributions, are approximately double that, namely e 188 per worker and day. Workers
take on average 9 days of sick leave per year, which yields total yearly labor cost ofe 1,692. In a firm
with 500 workers, the direct expenditures for sick leaves are therefore e 846,000 per year, a 6.5%
increase of which equals e 54,990. These expenditures become increasingly large over time. After
six quarters, the additional sick pay cost are already up to roughly e 150,000 per year. This is likely
a lower bound of the true economic impact of ML-induced job stress, because it does not capture
(child care) subsidies that only apply to married people, and from the birth register, given that parents were married at
the time of birth. Hence, we only observe a subset of all marriages.
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productivity losses that go beyond sick days or the potential cost of losing workers altogether due
to severe illness. We can therefore assume that the true effect is likely an order of magnitude larger.
Given these results, a central question for managers is whether to cut workers or wages if their
firm is in distress. We cannot give a definitive answer to that. To get at least some idea of how
the externalities of wage cuts and dismissals compare, however, we can look at sick leave takeup
in firms with workers who experienced significant wage cuts. We therefore draw a separate sample
of firms where the daily wage of at least one employee is reduced by more than 10 percent from
one year to another, provided that they did not switch from full-time to part-time status.18 We
then calculate, for a period of three years around this wage cut, the average number of sick days of
coworkers in the same firm that did not also experience a wage cut.19
In Figure 6 we plot event study estimates for changes in coworker sick days, controlling for
calendar year fixed effects. Sick days appear to remain stable before the wage cut and increase
significantly afterwards. If we estimate a model with a single post-treatment dummy, we obtain a
coefficient of 1.02 (? < 0.001), suggesting that coworkers increase sick days by roughly 1 day per
year due to the wage cut. Compared to average pre-treatment yearly sick days, this amounts to an
increase of 8.4 percent. Albeit being slightly larger, this coefficient is not economically different
from the downsizing effect we have found above. This supports the idea that downsizing and wage
cuts appear to emit similar negative health externalities. We note that, while this may seem at
odds with the narrative in Bewley (1999), this comparison is not nearly nuanced enough to take a
definitive stance on that. Even if sick days increase to a similar degree, other responses to either
measure, such as motivation or commitment, are difficult to tease out in our setting.
A factor we leave out of this discussion—but one that is indeed also important when it comes
to the potential impact on firms—is presenteeism. While some workers may have to take sick
leaves due to severe illness, others with more minor conditions may refrain to take leave and go
18Part-time status is defined as working 30 hours or less. Unfortunately we do not observe smaller reductions in
working hours in our data.
19This gives us a sample of 316,728 wage cut events. Importantly, this is a different sample of workers compared to
the one we use for our main analysis. The average number of coworker sick days per year is calculated for all workers
that are employed in the same firm but did not also experience a wage cut. We do not impose a tenure requirement for
coworkers; for every year we calculate average sick days for all workers who were employed in the firm.
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to work instead. This may be true especially in times where workers fear for their own job. This
has wide-ranging effects that are well-documented in the literature, for example through fostering
infectious disease transmission (Pichler & Ziebarth 2017).
VII. Conclusion
We show that downsizing leads to ill health in the firm’s retained workforce. Using high-quality
administrative data from Austria, we find that drug prescriptions and hospital stays increase signif-
icantly after MLs, and that this is partly driven by upticks in mental and cardiac disease. Older,
low-wage, and blue collar workers respond particularly strongly to MLs. The main mechanism we
have in mind to explain these findings is stress, which likely arises because workers fear for their
own job after downsizing periods. In contrast, there is little evidence that income effects or changes
in workload can explain our results. Finally, we find that health externalities imply significant costs
for firms, as sick leave takeup increases significantly after MLs. Wage cuts, as another potential
cost reduction measure for firms in financial distress, appear to have similar spillover effects as
downsizing.
Our results suggest that there are important health externalities of MLs that have not previously
been considered in the literature. We think that this has important implications for policy and
management. Measures such as targeted health counseling or prevention may be helpful to avoid
health spillovers to retained workers. Furthermore, management may consider offering short-term
employment protection in order to reassure workers and potentially dampen these effects.
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A. Tables and figures
Table 1 — Descriptive statistics
Treatment Control
Mean Std. dev. Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Covariates and sample split variables
Age (years) 40.7 9.2 40.3 41.8
Tenure (years) 9.9 7.6 9.6 11.1
Female 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.33
Blue collar 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.40
Wage p. a. (1,000 e ) 28.6 11.0 28.4 29.4
Firm size 308.0 338.5 305.2 316.2
Relative ML size0 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.08
Turnover prev. year 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Local unemployment 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.11
(b) Main outcomes
Physician fees
Count 5.20 14.25 5.07 5.59
Expenditure (e ) 55.9 109.3 54.7 59.5
Drug prescriptions
Count 1.17 2.51 1.13 1.26
Expenditure (e ) 25.0 182.0 24.3 26.9
Inpatient days
Count 0.17 1.48 0.17 0.20
Expenditure (e ) 28.9 249.1 27.2 34.1
Mental conditions
Diagnosed 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.002
Psychotherapy 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.003
Drug expenditure (e )1 0.9 8.1 0.9 1.0
Cardiac conditions
Event2 0.001 0.030 0.001 0.001
Drug expenditure (e )3 3.7 18.5 3.5 4.3
Musculoskeletal conditions
Diagnosed 0.032 0.176 0.031 0.034
Drug expenditure (e )4 1.0 6.0 1.0 1.1
(d) Other outcomes
Addiction outcomes
Opioids 0.00035 0.01861 0.00035 0.00034
Alcohol 0.00005 0.00729 0.00005 0.00005
Sick days 2.3 7.4 2.2 2.4
Notes: Quarterly means, # = 2,203,214; 0 laid-off workers relative to pre-ML firm size, 1 antidepres-
sants (ATC code N06A), 2 heart attacks and strokes, 3 cardiovascular system drugs (ATC category C),
e.g., beta blockers, 4 opioid (ATC codes N01AH and N02A) and non-opioid (M01, M02, and N02B)
painkillers,
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Table 2 — Effects of job stress on health
Physician visits Drug prescriptions Inpatient days
Count Log exp. Count Log exp. Count Log exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Average effects
Average effect 0.015 0.005 0.028*** 0.012** 0.021*** 0.014***
(0.053) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
(b) Dynamic effects
C = 1 −0.005 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.027** 0.015*
(0.094) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
C = 2 0.039 0.020 0.032*** 0.010 0.025** 0.018**
(0.121) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
C = 3 −0.018 0.014 0.030** 0.014 0.019 0.008
(0.094) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
C = 4 0.051 0.024* 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.010 0.014
(0.104) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
C = 5 −0.002 0.018 0.050*** 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.024***
(0.109) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
C = 6 0.134 0.044*** 0.079*** 0.037*** 0.080*** 0.048***
(0.114) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Sample mean 5.20 2.49 1.17 1.22 0.17 0.20
-test for pretrends† 0.1 (0.996) 0.8 (0.541) 1.0 (0.447) 0.9 (0.483) 0.7 (0.620) 0.5 (0.781)
Notes: This table displays DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on health. The sample is based on 169,478 worker × ML dyads
observed over 13 quarters, which gives a total number of observations in each column of 2,203,214. Panel (a) is a static DD model based
on equation (1), where the coefficients can be interpreted as average treatment effects on the respective outcome. Panel (b) is a dynamic
DD model based on equation (2); the 6 pre-ML time dummies are not reported explicitly but we test for their joint significance below. In
columns (1) and (2) the outcome is outpatient physician visits, in columns (3) and (4) drug prescriptions, and in columns (5) and (6) days
spent in hospital. We measure the number of physician visits (1), drug packages prescribed (3), and days spent in hospital (5) along with log
expenditure arising from each outcome. Each regression controls for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker × ML fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, stars indicate significance levels: * ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
†We test for pretrends using the (non-reported) pre-ML time dummies from the models in panel (b); ( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1). The -test is against the
null of no pretrend in the respective outcome. Corresponding ?-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3 —Mechanisms for the effects of job stress on health
Mental conditions Cardiac conditions Musculoskeletal conditions
Diagnosed Psychotherapy Drug exp. Event Drug exp. Diagnosed Drug exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(a) Average effects
Average effect 0.0003 0.0004* 0.003 0.0001 0.007** 0.0009 0.002
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.003)
(b) Dynamic effects
C = 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.003 0.0002 0.006** 0.0009 0.001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
C = 2 0.0002 0.0006** 0.005** 0.0003 0.002 0.0003 0.006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
C = 3 0.0003 0.0007** 0.005** 0.0002 0.007* 0.0004 0.004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
C = 4 0.0002 0.0004 0.003 0.0003 0.01** 0.0006 0.006
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
C = 5 0.0004 0.0007* 0.004 0.0002 0.01*** 0.003** 0.01***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
C = 6 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.007** 0.0002 0.02*** 0.003** 0.009*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Sample mean 0.002 0.002 0.08 0.0009 0.3 0.03 0.2
-test for pretrends† 1.6 (0.150) 0.9 (0.458) 2.2 (0.044) 0.9 (0.469) 0.5 (0.836) 0.3 (0.935) 1.6 (0.148)
Notes: This table displays DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on additional health outcomes. The sample is based on 169,478 worker ×ML
dyads observed over 13 quarters, which gives a total number of observations in each column of 2,203,214. Panel (a) is a static DD model based on
equation (1), where the coefficients can be interpreted as average treatment effects on the respective outcome. Panel (b) is a dynamic DD model based
on equation (2); the 6 pre-ML time dummies are not reported explicitly but we test for their joint significance below. In column (1) the outcome is
an indicator for whether anxiety, burnout, or depression is diagnosed in a worker; (2) is whether the worker is in psychotherapy, (3) is log expenditure
for antidepressants and benzodiazepines; (3) is whether a stroke or a heart attack occurs, (4) is log expenditure for cardiovascular system drugs, (5) is
whether a musculoskeletal condition is diagnosed, and (6) is log expenditure for both opioid and non-opioid painkillers. Each regression controls for
worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×ML fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, stars indicate significance levels: * ? < 0.10,
** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
†We test for pretrends using the (non-reported) pre-ML time dummies from the models in panel (b); ( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1). The -test is against the null of no
pretrend in the respective outcome. Corresponding ?-values are reported in parentheses.
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Average effect −0.0001 0.00003
(0.0001) (0.00003)
(b) Dynamic effects
C = 1 −0.00007 0.00002
(0.00009) (0.00003)
C = 2 −0.00008 0.00004
(0.0001) (0.00003)
C = 3 0.00003 0.00001
(0.0001) (0.00003)
C = 4 −0.000008 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00003)
C = 5 −0.00008 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00004)
C = 6 0.0001 0.00001
(0.0001) (0.00004)
Sample mean 0.00035 0.00005
-test for pretrends† 0.8 (0.607) 0.6 (0.755)
Notes: This table displays DD estimates for the effect of surviv-
ing aML on additional health outcomes. The sample is based on
169,478 worker × ML dyads observed over 13 quarters, which
gives a total number of observations in each columnof 2,203,214.
Panel (a) is a static DD model based on equation (1), where the
coefficients can be interpreted as average treatment effects on
the respective outcome. Panel (b) is a dynamic DD model based
on equation (2); the 6 pre-ML time dummies are not reported
explicitly but we test for their joint significance below. In col-
umn (1) the outcome is a binary variable indicating whether the
worker is treated for alcohol addiction, in column (2) the out-
come is whether the worker is treated for opioid addiction. Each
regression controls for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×
ML fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
stars indicate significance levels: * ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05,
*** ? < 0.01.
†We test for pretrends using the (non-reported) pre-ML time
dummies from the models in panel (b); ( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1). The -
test is against the null of no pretrend in the respective outcome.
Corresponding ?-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 5 — Robustness to choosing a different control group
Physician visits Drug prescriptions Inpatient days
(1) (2) (3)
(a) Alternative control group
C = 1 0.012 0.024** 0.010
(0.097) (0.011) (0.011)
C = 2 0.054 0.020* 0.025**
(0.120) (0.012) (0.012)
C = 3 −0.016 0.012 0.019
(0.093) (0.012) (0.012)
C = 4 0.066 0.001 0.025**
(0.108) (0.012) (0.013)
C = 5 0.015 0.032*** 0.036***
(0.113) (0.012) (0.014)
C = 6 0.141 0.066*** 0.059***
(0.116) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 1,503,567 1,503,567 1,503,567
Sample mean 4.76 0.19 1.12
-test for pretrends† 0.1 (0.999) 1.8 (0.097) 1.4 (0.205)
(b) Baseline
C = 1 −0.005 0.014 0.027**
(0.094) (0.011) (0.011)
C = 2 0.039 0.032*** 0.025**
(0.121) (0.012) (0.012)
C = 3 −0.018 0.030** 0.019
(0.094) (0.012) (0.012)
C = 4 0.051 0.039*** 0.010
(0.104) (0.013) (0.012)
C = 5 −0.002 0.050*** 0.044***
(0.109) (0.014) (0.011)
C = 6 0.134 0.079*** 0.080***
(0.114) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 2,203,214 2,203,214 2,203,214
Sample mean 5.20 1.17 0.17
-test for pretrends† 0.1 (0.996) 1.0 (0.447) 0.7 (0.620)
Notes: This table displays DD estimates for the effect of surviving aML on additional health outcomes
for a control group matched from firms that do not experience a ML, see the notes of Table 2. We use
only the count measures from Table 2 as outcomes. Each regression controls for worker age, tenure,
and a set of worker × ML fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, stars indicate
significance levels: * ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
†We test for pretrends using the (non-reported) pre-ML time dummies from the models in panel (b);
( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1). The -test is against the null of no pretrend in the respective outcome. Corresponding
?-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 6 —Worker-level heterogeneity in the effects of job stress on health
Gender Age Tenure Collar Wage
Female Male < 40 ≥ 40 Short Long Blue White Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Physician visits −0.100 0.063 0.003 0.004 0.030 0.003 0.096 −0.027 0.155** −0.113
(0.100) (0.062) (0.071) (0.075) (0.081) (0.071) (0.077) (0.069) (0.071) (0.079)
Sample mean 7.18 4.22 4.11 6.03 4.96 5.44 5.03 5.31 5.49 4.92
Pretrends† 0.392 0.897 0.720 0.800 0.548 0.555 0.600 0.713 0.655 0.991
Drug prescriptions 0.019 0.030*** 0.012 0.030** 0.022* 0.026** 0.035** 0.027** 0.046*** 0.010
(0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Sample mean 1.38 1.06 0.75 1.49 1.03 1.31 1.24 1.12 1.23 1.10
Pretrends† 0.100 0.990 0.843 0.305 0.121 0.531 0.432 0.065 0.204 0.393
Inpatient days 0.027*** 0.018** −0.001 0.034*** 0.013* 0.024** 0.029*** 0.016* 0.020* 0.017*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Sample mean 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
Pretrends† 0.705 0.420 0.990 0.413 0.530 0.310 0.662 0.972 0.753 0.493
Notes: This table displays subgroup DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on health by worker socioeconomic characteristics. Gender, tenure, and wage are split at the sample median. We report
average treatment effects from the static DD model in equation (1). For details on the outcome variables, please consult the notes of Table 2. Each regression controls for worker age, tenure, and a set of
worker ×ML fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, stars indicate significance levels: * ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
† To test for pretrends we run an auxilliary regression similar to the dynamic DD model in equation (2) and perform an -test for the joint significance of the estimated pre-ML coefficients ( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1).
Here we only report the corresponding ?-value of this test.
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Table 7 — Heterogeneity by firm characteristics and local unemployment rate in the effects of job stress on health
Firm characteristics Local unemployment
Firm size Relative ML size Turnover rate
< 200 ≥ 200 Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physician visits 0.059 −0.027 0.002 0.019 −0.017 0.002 0.065 0.046
(0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.122) (0.074) (0.214) (0.058)
Sample mean 5.27 5.12 5.42 4.98 5.17 5.23 4.10 5.26
Pretrends† 0.974 0.998 0.665 0.573 0.992 0.820 0.532 0.998
Drug prescriptions 0.024** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.017 0.056*** 0.026** 0.008 0.029***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.040) (0.009)
Sample mean 1.14 1.20 1.22 1.11 1.16 1.17 1.10 1.17
Pretrends† 0.686 0.525 0.155 0.791 0.830 0.631 0.300 0.553
Inpatient days 0.007 0.034*** 0.021* 0.020** 0.060*** 0.007 0.007 0.020***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.033) (0.007)
Sample mean 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18
Pretrends† 0.676 0.142 0.258 0.621 0.561 0.752 0.210 0.547
Notes: This table displays subgroup DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on health by firm and local economy characteristics. We report average treatment effects
from the static DD model in equation (1). Relative ML size, turnover, and unemployment rate are split at the sample median. For details on the outcome variables please
consult the notes of Table 2. Each regression controls for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker × ML fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, stars
indicate significance levels: * ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
† To test for pretrends we run an auxilliary regression similar to the dynamic DD model in equation (2) and perform an -test for the joint significance of the estimated
pre-ML coefficients ( V̂6, . . . , V̂−1). Here we only report the corresponding ?-value of this test.
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ii. Log expenditure
(c) Inpatient days
Notes: These graphs depict dynamic DD estimates for effects of surviving a ML on health, 6 quarters before until 6
quarters after the mass layoff. The post-ML coefficients are taken from Table 2. Scatters represent point estimates. The
blue-shaded area is a 90% confidence band, the dashed line a 95% confidence band, both based on firm-level clustered
standard errors. In each regression we control for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×ML fixed effects.
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ii. Male
(b) Log drug expenditure
Notes: These graphs depict dynamic DD estimates for effects of surviving a ML on the probability of having a stroke
or a heart attack (panel a) and log expenditure for cardiovascular drugs (panel b), 6 quarters before until 6 quarters after
the mass layoff. Scatters represent point estimates. The blue-shaded area is a 90% confidence band, the dashed line a
95% confidence band, both based on firm-level clustered standard errors. In each regression we control for worker age,
tenure, and a set of worker-level fixed effects.
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Notes: This graph plots average daily wages for ML survivors relative to their ML quarter, with wages being regression-
adjusted for age, gender, tenure, occupation, and calendar quarter fixed effects (we regress wages on these covariates,
recover the residuals from this regression, and add those to the sample mean of daily wages).
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95% CI
90% CI
Average effect: Est. = -0.00002 (p = 0.935)
Test for pretrends: F = 1.20 (p = 0.306)
Notes: This graph depicts dynamic DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on the probability of being diagnosed
with a malign neoplasm, 6 quarters before until 6 quarters after the mass layoff. Scatters represent point estimates. The
blue-shaded area is a 95% confidence band, the dashed line a 90% confidence band, both based on firm-level clustered
standard errors. In each regression we control for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×ML fixed effects..
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95% CI
90% CI
Average effect: Est. = -0.00002 (p = 0.935)
Test for pretrends: F = 1.20 (p = 0.306)
Notes: This graph depicts dynamic DD estimates for the effect of surviving a ML on the number of sick days, 6
quarters before until 6 quarters after the mass layoff. Scatters represent point estimates. The blue-shaded area is a 95%
confidence band, the dashed line a 90% confidence band, both based on firm-level clustered standard errors. In each
regression we control for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×ML fixed effects.
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95% CI
Notes: For this graph, we identify a sample of workers who experience at least a 10 percent annual wage cut between
1998 and 2014 in Upper Austria, provided that the worker did not switch from full-time to part-time status. In total,
we have 411,925 such events (note that this is a different sample of workers compared to our main analysis). We then
calculate the average number of sick days per year for all coworkers in the same firm that did not also experience a wage
cut. We then plot the change in the average number of these coworker sick days three years before and three years after
the wage cut. If a worker experiences multiple wage cuts, we only include the first. If we estimate this model with a
single post wage cut dummy, we obtain an increase in average sick days of V̂ = 1.02 (? < 0.001) relative to year −1,
the pre-treatment sample mean is 12.1 days.
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A. Web appendix
This web appendix contains additional tables and figures for the paper “The health externalities of
downsizing” by Alexander Ahammer, Dominik Grübl, and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer.
A.1. Additional tables and figures
Table A.1 — Effects by spousal wage
Females Males
Spouse wage Spouse wage Spouse wage Spouse wage
low high low high
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physician fees −0.045 0.207 0.051 −0.089
(0.171) (0.146) (0.110) (0.149)
Sample mean 7.37 6.67 4.33 4.12
Observations 71,032 95,056 221,195 406,328
Drug prescriptions 0.089*** −0.014 0.013 0.008
(0.030) (0.025) (0.015) (0.010)
Sample mean 1.56 1.47 1.14 1.00
Observations 71,032 95,056 221,195 406,328
Inpatient days 0.029 0.027 0.035*** 0.008
(0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010)
Sample mean 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16
Observations 71,032 95,056 221,195 406,328
Notes: This table compares the average treatment effect estimates for our three count outcomes from Table 2
(columns 1, 3, and 5) by spousal wage, split at the median wage distribution across all spouses. Since we do not
observe marital status directly, this is based on a subset of married workers we can identify based on a specific set
of tax deductions and (child care) subsidies. We can confirm marriage status for 61,047 worker-ML dyads in our
data; this would correspond to a marriage rate of 36 percent, The overall number of observations is 793,611. Each
regression controls for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker ×ML fixed effects. Stars indicate significance levels:
* ? < 0.10, ** ? < 0.05, *** ? < 0.01.
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Figure A.1 — Treatment and control group definition
Notes: This sketch shows how we define the treatment and control group for our baseline regressions. Importantly, the control group is chosen from the set of firms
that have their MLs 7 to 10 quarters after the treatment group ML in C = 0. We then compare health status in both the treatment and control group between C = −6
and C = 6. Because we require the control group to be employed with the same firm already 13 quarters prior to their ML, we impose a similar tenure condition to
the treatment group.
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(c) Inpatient days
Notes: This figures plots raw data means for the number of physician visits, drug prescriptions, and inpatient days,
relative to the ML quarter in both the treatment group and the control group. For the treatment group, C = 0 is the
period of the actual ML, for the control group, C = 0 is when a ‘placebo’ shock occurs, with their actual shock occurring
between C = 7 and C = 10. Similar to Fadlon & Nielsen (2019), we normalize the level of the control group’s outcome
to the treatment group’s level at C = 0.
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95% CI
90% CI
Average effect: Est. = 0.0029 (p = 0.181)
Test for pretrends: F = 2.17 (p = 0.044)
Notes: These graphs depict dynamic DD estimates for effects of surviving a ML on log antidepressant expenditure, 6
quarters before until 6 quarters after the ML. Scatters represent estimates which can be interpreted as the change in log
expenditure compared to the quarter of the ML between present and future survivors. The blue-shaded area represents
a 90% confidence band, the dashed line represents a 95% confidence band.
46





























-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
(c) Inpatient days
Baseline 95% CI Balanced treatment and control group
Notes: These graphs depict dynamic DD estimates for effects of surviving a ML on health, 6 quarters before until 6
quarters after the mass layoff. In each regression we control for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker × ML fixed
effects.
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(c) Inpatient days
Baseline 95% CI ML size weighted
Notes: These graphs depict dynamic DD estimates for effects of surviving a ML on health, 6 quarters before until 6
quarters after the mass layoff. In each regression we control for worker age, tenure, and a set of worker × ML fixed
effects.
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